Evolution of cooperation has been one of the most important problems in sociobiology, and many researchers have revealed mechanisms that can facilitate the evolution of cooperation. However, most studies deal only with one cooperative behaviour, even though some organisms perform two or more cooperative behaviours. The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum performs two cooperative behaviours in starvation: fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Here, we constructed a model that couples these two behaviours, and we found that the two behaviours are maintained due to the emergence of cyclic dominance, although cooperation cannot evolve if only either of the two behaviours is performed. The common chemoattractant cyclic AMP is used in both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, providing a biological context for this coupling. Cyclic dominance emerges regardless of the existence of mating types or spatial structure in the model. In addition, cooperation can re-emerge in the population even after it goes extinct. These results indicate that the two cooperative behaviours of the social amoeba are maintained due to the common chemical signal that underlies both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. We demonstrate the importance of coupling multiple games when the underlying behaviours are associated with one another.
Introduction

1
Evolution of cooperation has been a challenging topic in sociobiology. Although it is a widespread 2 behaviour, apparent from human societies [7] to microbial communities [55] , cooperation is vulner-3 able to invasion by defectors. Cooperators pay a cost for helping other individuals, while defectors 4 pay no cost but receive the benefits from cooperators. As a consequence, natural selection should 5 favour defectors [29, 56] . However, many studies have revealed mechanisms that facilitate the 6 evolution of cooperation, including kin discrimination [21, 23, 42] , spatial structure that enables 7 cooperators to interact frequently with one another [2, 8, 26, 27] , and a by-product which increases 8 the benefit for cooperators (e.g., pleiotropy [10, 25, 51, 52] ).
9
Most studies have explored only one cooperative behaviour at a time. However, some organisms, 10 such as the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum, perform multiple types of cooperation. It has 11 been known that D. discoideum performs two distinct types of cooperative behaviours in starvation. 12 One of these is fruiting body formation, wherein some cells differentiate into spore cells and survive 13 while other cells differentiate into nonviable stalk cells and aid in dispersal of spore cells [41] . The 14 offspring germinate from spore cells after conditions become favourable [22] . The other cooperative 15 behaviour is known as macrocyst formation, wherein some cells become sexually mature and produce 16 offspring after forming diploid zygote cells, but other cells remain vegetative and provide energy 17 to the zygote cells through cannibalism [31] . The haploid progeny eventually appears, but the 18 germination process remains unclear [31] .
In fruiting body formation, cells first aggregate by responding to synchronously secreted cyclic 20 AMP (cAMP) [13] , and then, the aggregated cells form multicellular slugs and develop into fruiting 21 bodies. When cells from two or more strains form a fruiting body (i.e., forming a chimeric fruiting 22 body), the cell-type ratio has a large effect of the fitness of each strain [43, 36] . If cells from one 23 strain differentiate only into spore cells, this strain can receive a large benefit through the formation 24 of chimeric fruiting bodies because they pay no cost for stalk formation. As differentiation is a key 25 to fruiting body formation, theoretical studies have focused on signalling chemicals that induce 26 stalk formation [32, 50] . 27 In macrocyst formation, about 16% of cells first mature sexually and differentiate into gametes or 28 fusion component (FC) cells [30] , whereas other cells remain vegetative. In the heterothallic strains 29 of D. discoideum, there are three mating types, and each FC cell fuses with that of a different 30 mating type [3] . After cell fusion, pronuclear fusion occurs [18] and zygote cells are formed. The 31 zygote cells then secrete cAMP [1] to collect the vegetative cells around them for cannibalization, 32 which leads to mature zygote cells in the macrocysts. Macrocyst formation can be considered as 33 a form of cooperation because (i) the division of labours between FC cells (producing offspring 34 thorough macrocyst formation) and vegetative cells (offering energy thorough cannibalization) is 35 similar to the relationship between spore cells and stalk cells in fruiting body formation, and (ii) 36 the vegetative cells can avoid the cannibalism and survive if they ignore cAMP from the macrocyst 37 (i.e., a strain behaves as a defector in macrocyst formation). In contrast to fruiting body formation, 38 however, there are fewer studies on the evolution of macrocyst formation, likely due to difficulties 39 in germinating macrocysts in the laboratory [11] . To our knowledge, there are only two theoretical 40 studies on macrocyst formation; one shows that fluctuations in food availability play an important 41 role in maintaining the ability to aggregate the vegetative cells [6] , and the other indicates that 42 without food fluctuation, vegetative cells would still respond to cAMP if macrocyst formation co-43 occurs with fruiting body formation and if cooperation in fruiting body formation is preserved 44 [39] . 45 Here, we use a modeling approach to demonstrate that the two cooperative behaviours of D. 46 discoideum, fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, can be maintained by coupling the 47 evolution of these two behaviours. First, we considered a very simple situation that ignored mating 48 types and spatial structure. In this model, cyclic dominance, a loop structure where one strategy 49 beats another strategy but this strategy is beaten by still another strategy, emerged under some 50 conditions (see inequality (7) and figure 2), and cooperation in both fruiting body formation and 51 macrocyst formation was maintained. We then introduced variation in mating types and assumed 52 that macrocyst formation occurred only between different mating types. Cyclic dominance again 53 emerged in this case. When the model included spatial structure, such that each colony of the social 54 amoeba interacted only with their neighbours, this result held and cooperation was maintained. 55 Thus, by coupling these cooperative behaviours, cyclic dominance emerges and both behaviours 56 are maintained even if it is assumed that neither cooperative behaviour can evolve alone. These 57 results are consistent regardless of mating types and spatial structure introduced to the model if 58 the environment where fruiting body formation co-occurs with macrocysts is assumed.
59
Models
60
In this section, we describe the methods for the simulations we performed. The materials and 61 methods for the experiments conducted in this study can be found in the Supplementary information 62 (SI).
63
Model assumptions
64
As both fruiting bodies and macrocysts are formed under dark and dry conditions [39] (see also 65 our experimental results in SI and figure S9), we assume that D. discoideum can perform both 66 fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Note that we ignore homologous recombination 67 2/13 during macrocyst formation. For simplicity, we first assume that both fruiting body formation and 68 macrocyst formation are represented as a prisoner's dilemma (PD) game, where the defector is the 69 evolutionarily stable strategy [28] . Although the PD game can be inadequate for conceptualizing 70 fruiting body formation nor macrocyst formation and cooperation can evolve in each game without 71 coupling them in nature, we conceptualize the two games by the PD games to assume the most 72 difficult conditions for cooperators to evolve in each game. We shall show that cooperation can be 73 maintained by coupling the two games under this assumption.
74
The payoff matrices for the two games are given by 75 Cooperate Defect Cooperate
where i = 1 corresponds to fruiting body formation, and i = 2 refers to macrocyst formation. It 76 should be noted that the inequality b i > a i i > 0 is satisfied for i = 1, 2 and that cooperation 77 cannot evolve if only either of the two games is performed.
78
Cooperators of fruiting body formation are those that produce both spore cells and stalk cells, 79 whereas defectors produce only spore cells. When cooperators form fruiting bodies with another 80 cooperator, they receive benefit a 1 . On the other hand, defectors receive b 1 when they exploit 81 the cooperators by forming chimeric fruiting bodies, but the cooperator receives no benefit in this 82 case. However, when defectors interact with another defector, they receive only a small benefit 1 83 because they both are deficient in stalk formation. Such a mutant strain is referred to as fbxA − in 84 D. discoideum [12] .
85
In macrocyst formation, cooperators provide energy to zygote cells by making vegetative cells 86 respond to cAMP to allow cannibalization by zygote cells. On the other hand, defectors avoid 87 cannibalistic attack by ignoring cAMP. Such a mutant strain is known as TMC1 [40] . When the 88 two cooperators produce macrocysts together, they each receive a benefit a 2 , as macrocysts obtain 89 enough energy through cannibalism. On the other hand, if a defector interacts with a cooperator, 90 the defector receives b 2 by avoiding a cannibalistic attack, but the cooperator receives no benefit. 91 However, when the two defectors form macrocysts together, they receive a very small benefit 2 , as 92 macrocysts cannot receive enough energy from the vegetative cells alone.
93
It should be noted that the common chemical signal cAMP plays an important role in both 94 fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation; aggregation requires cAMP in both cases. If 95 cells do not aggregate in macrocyst formation (i.e., a defector of macrocyst formation), they do not 96 aggregate in fruiting body formation either. In other words, defectors during macrocyst formation 97 cannot join in fruiting body formation. This phenomenon was experimentally identified [40] , and 98 we reflect it in the models ( 0 in payoff matrix given by equation (2)).
99
We began by building a very simple model, where mating types and spatial structure were 100 ignored. In this case, there were only three strategies: a cooperator of both fruiting body formation 101 and macrocyst formation (C), a defector of fruiting body formation that behaved as a cooperator 102 of macrocyst formation (D F ), and a defector of macrocyst formation that could not join in fruiting 103 body formation (D M ). The payoff matrix A is given by
where θ is the probability that macrocyst formation occurs, while 1 − θ refers to fruiting body 105 formation (0 ≤ θ ≤ 1). 0 is the payoff for remaining as solitary vegetative cells in fruiting body 106 formation. For simplicity, we assume that starvation continues for a long period, where almost all 107 vegetative cells die [9] . In this case, it is reasonable to assume that 0 min{ 1 , 2 }. h denotes 108 the payoff effect for forming small fruiting bodies (0 < h ≤ 1). When a cooperator of both fruiting 109 body formation (C) (or a defector of fruiting body formation (D 
115
Due to the constraint of the responsibility to cAMP, the game of fruiting body formation is no 116 longer a PD game. It would be better to call the third strategy D M as a solitary or a loner in the 117 game of fruiting body formation, which never joins in the game and always receives the benefit 0 118 regardless of the strategy of the counterpart. Even in this extended PD game, however, the defect 119 D F is still the evolutionarily stable strategy, which can be derived by equation (2) when θ = 0.
120
Next, we introduced mating types (type 1 and type 2). In this model, there exist six strategies 121
, where the subscripts indicate the mating types of each strategy 122 (e.g., C 1 represents a cooperator with mating type 1). Within the mating types, only fruiting body 123 formation is performed, whereas both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation are per-124 formed between the mating types. Note that θ represents the probability that macrocyst formation 125 is performed between the mating types. In the model including mating types, therefore, the payoff 126 matrix S is described as
where A(0) is a 3 × 3 payoff matrix for the same mating type strategies (they perform only fruiting 128 body formation), while A(θ) refers to the payoff matrix for different mating type players that 129 perform macrocyst formation with the probability of θ.
130
It should be noted that we ignore the failure of macrocyst formation: i.e., producing FC cells 131 when interacting with the same mating type strains. This assumption will not change the main 132 results in this paper because even if a strain produces FC cell in error, the strain can obtain the 133 benefit from fruiting body formation. In macrocyst formation, some cells differentiate into FC cell 134 while the other cells remain vegetative cells. Such vegetative cells should be able to perform fruiting 135 body formation. Therefore, the strain can receive the benefit from fruiting body formation in the 136 case of failure in macrocyst formation, although the benefits should be smaller than a 1 due to the 137 4/13 cost of producing FC cells, which will die at the end. This cost should be small because the ratio 138 of FC cells is about about 16% [30] . Therefore, the failure of macrocyst formation will not change 139 our main results below.
140
Replicator Dynamics
141
The continuous and discrete replicator dynamics are defined, respectively:
where x i is the frequency of strategy i, x is a vector of the frequencies of each strategy (x = (x i )), 143 and P is a payoff matrix. When the mating types are ignored, P equals to the payoff matrix A 144 given by equation (2) while P equals to the payoff matrix S by equation (3) if mating types are 145 included. Numerical computation for continuous replicator dynamics was conducted in Python 146 using the integrators of "ode" with "dopri5" or "odeint" in the Scipy package [19] .
147
Agent-Based Model
148
One of the advantages of using an agent-based model is to introduce spatial structure. As macrocyst 149 formation occurs only between mating types, spatial structure can have an effect on the frequencies 150 of fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. For example, only fruiting body formation 151 would occur if all colonies in the neighbourhood have the same mating type. In addition, the spatial 152 structure would be important for considering the social amoeba in nature, because they perform 153 both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation though aggregation. In other words, the 154 cells interact only with their neighbours. From these two reasons, we analysed the model with the 155 spatial structure.
156
In the agent-based model, each agent represents a small colony of D. discoideum that has one 157 of the six strategies ( with their eight neighbours at one time step. After all agents finish their interaction and their total 160 payoffs are calculated, they synchronously update their strategies to those of their neighbours with 161 some probabilities given below. In many studies, the Fermi function f (w) = 1/ {1 + exp(−w)} 162 is used as a stochastic update process [44, 53] , but the Fermi function is for the pairwise update 163 process. Therefore, we defined the probability Π ij that agent i adopts the strategy of agent j using 164 the softmax function
where p i is the total payoff of agent i, N i is the set of agents in the neighbourhood of agent i 166 (including agent i itself), and K is the inverse of the intensity of selection. It is more likely that 167 agent i adopts the strategy of agent j in the next time step if p i < p j , but agent i stochastically 168 may adopt the strategy of agent l even if p i > p l . At the K → 0 limit, agent i adopts only the 169 strategy of the agent whose payoff is the highest in the neighbourhood. By contrast, as K increases, 170 it is more likely that each agent randomly adopts a strategy in their neighbourhood (selection does 171 not work in the K → ∞ limit).
172
We performed the pairwise invasion analysis at 100×100 lattice points. One of the two strategies 173 is called an invader, whose initial frequency is 0.01, and the other is a resident. We ran the simulation 174 for 1, 000 time steps at various parameter values, and we replicated the simulation 50 times in each 175 case. We then investigated whether the invaders excluded the residents (the invader frequency 176 was greater than 0.99 at the end of the simulation) or they were maintained (the frequencies were 177 greater than 0.01). If invaders excluded the residents, this indicated that the invaders beat the 178 5/13 residents. If the invaders did not exclude the residents but they were maintained, they coexisted 179 with the residents.
180
We then simulated the situations where all six strategies existed at the initial conditions. In this 181 case, we used 300 × 300 lattice points to reduce stochastic effects. In each simulation, the initial 182 frequencies of all strategies were equal, and simulations were continued for 100, 000 time steps. We 183 replicated the simulation 10 times at each value of θ.
184
We also investigated the effect of mutation in the agent-based model. We again used 300 × 300 185 lattice points, but here we assumed that mutation was rare; at each 500 time step, one agent 186 was randomly chosen to update the strategy to one of the other five strategies, which was again 187 randomly chosen. All codes for the agent-based model were written in C language.
188
Data Availability
189
The simulation codes, the Python script for the analysis, and the experimental data are available 190 at GitHub (https://github.com/ShotaSHIBASAKI/Cyclic-dominance-emerges).
191
Results
192
Excluding mating types and spatial structure
193
First of all, we built the simple model that does not include mating types nor spatial structure. In 194 this case, payoff matrix given by equation (2) shows a rock-scissors-paper (RSP) game, approxi-195 mately if
see SI for derivation. In other words, when inequality (7) 
206
In addition, we found that the continuous replicator dynamics [48] has a unique internal equi-207 librium G, to which any other interior point converges if inequality (7) holds (figure 2, see SI for 208 detail). In this case, a cooperator of both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation C 209 is maintained, although it is not an evolutionarily stable strategy [24] . Therefore, cooperation is 210 maintained if there exist two games, even though cooperation cannot evolve when the social amoeba 211 plays ether of the two games. Other examples of the evolutionary dynamics in this model are shown 212 in figure S1 .
213
It should be noted, however, that the application of continuous replicator dynamics is unlikely 214 to be valid for D. discoideum because fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation occur in 215 discrete generations; fruiting body formation and/or macrocyst formation occur through starvation, 216 with the offspring subsequently emerging. Thus, discrete replicator dynamics should be applied. 217 Mathematically, the continuous replicator dynamics is a limited case of discrete replicator dynamics 218 [5] , which means the result shown in figure 2 is not always valid when the discrete replicator 219 dynamics is applied. Indeed, we found that with discrete replicator dynamics, the range wherein 220 any orbit converges to the internal point G is narrower than that in the case of continuous replicator 221 dynamics (inequality (7), see also SI and figure S2 ). The evolutionary dynamics given by continuous replicator dynamics with payoff matrix by equation (2) when inequality (7) holds. The three orbits (cyan, yellow, and magenta) begin at different initial points but converge at the internal equilibrium G. The parameters are a1 = 1, b1 = 1.5, 1 = 10 −4 , a2 = 0.5, b2 = 1.2, 2 = 10 −4 , θ = 0.5, h = 0.5, and 0 = 10 −6 .
A model that includes mating types
223
When the model includes the existence of mating types, cyclic dominance emerges again (figure 224 3). In this case, fruiting body formation occurs both within and between the mating types, while 225 macrocyst formation occurs only between the mating types. This means that the parameter θ is 226 the probability that macrocyst formation occurs between mating types. As shown in figure 3, D 
235
Although continuous or discrete replicator dynamics can be applied when mating types are 236 introduced, it is difficult to calculate the stability of an interior equilibrium due to the high di-237 mensionality of the model. In addition, the initial mating type ratio has a large effect on the 238 evolutionary dynamics (figure S3). For these reasons, we used an agent-based model for additional 239 analyses.
240
A model that includes spatial structure
241
In the agent-based model, we again found cyclic dominance that was similar to figure 3, and this 242 result is confirmed by the results of the pairwise invasion analysis shown in figure S4-S6. We 243 then analysed cases wherein all six strategies coexisted equally in the initial conditions. Due to 244 the emergence of cyclic dominance, the cooperators (both C 1 and C 2 ) were maintained if θ was 245 sufficiently large (figure 4a). When θ = 0, only fruiting body formation occurred within and between 246 mating types. As a consequence, defectors of fruiting body formation (D 
257
In the model with spatial structure, cyclic dominance again contributes the maintenance of 258 cooperation. Although the spatial structure has the positive effect on the evolution of cooperation, 259 we used the parameter values with which Cs goes to extinct if the same mating type D F s invade 260 (figures S4). In addition, the previous study shows that if the game in macrocyst formation is 261 ignored and cyclic dominance disappears, the coexistence of the two mating types of D F is the 262 evolutionarily stable state [38] . From these two points, cyclic dominance can be considered to 263 contributing the evolution of cooperation in this model.
264
Next, mutation was introduced into the agent-based model. Under the assumption that mutation 265 occurs in each 500 time step, only a few strategies can coexist. Here, cooperators can re-invade 266 the population even after they are excluded ( figure S8 ). In the initial condition, two mating types 267 of cooperators (C 1 and C 2 ) coexist, but these cooperators disappear due to the invasion of the 268 two mating types of D F s. The coexistence of D F s is an evolutionarily stable state if the game for 269 macrocyst formation is ignored [38] , but this coexistence collapses with the invasion of one mating 270 type defector of macrocyst formation. After that, the either of the two mating types of cooperator 271 appears again by mutation and becomes dominant in the population. Thus, cooperators of both 272 fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation can be revived even after they disappear.
273
Discussion
274
In this paper, our models demonstrate that the two cooperative behaviours of D. discoideum, 275 fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation, can be maintained by coupling the two games. 276 While previous research assumed the maintenance of cooperation in fruiting body formation [39] , 277 we show that defectors can appear both in fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation. Even 278 though we assume that the defectors are the evolutionary stable strategies in in both of the two 279 8/13 games in the single game dynamics, the two cooperative behaviours can be maintained if the model 280 includes both of the games simultaneously.
281
The primary biological explanation for this result is that the two games are not independent; 282 the common chemical signal cAMP is necessary for aggregation in both fruiting body formation 283 (reviewed in [49] ) and macrocyst formation [1] . If some cells do not aggregate (i.e., defect) in 284 macrocyst formation, they receive benefits by avoiding the cannibalistic attack by zygote cells. On 285 the other hand, these cells have substantial costs because they cannot participate in fruiting body 286 formation. Indeed, a mutant that weakly expresses a cAMP receptor will result in poor aggregation 287 for both fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation [40] . This phenomenon is represented as 288 0 in the payoff matrix (equation 2), and this provides an explanation why the cooperator of both 289 fruiting body formation and macrocyst formation (C) can beat the defector of macrocyst formation 290 (D M ) in the most simple model, wherein the existence of mating types and spatial structure is 291 ignored (figure 2).
292
The key factor for the maintenance of the cooperators is the emergence of cyclic dominance. 293 Under a simple model without the inclusion of mating types and spatial structure, if the inequality 294 (7) is satisfied, the payoff matrix given by equation (2) follows an RSP game, which is a famous 295 example of cyclic dominance [45] . In addition, the continuous replicator dynamics show the existence 296 of the global attractor in this model (figure 2), and the discrete replicator dynamics shows a similar 297 result (figure S2). Moreover, even when mating types are introduced, cyclic dominance continues 298 to emerge ( figure 3) figure S4-S6 ). Due to cyclic dominance, all six strategies can coexist (figure 305 4), and cooperators can re-emerge even after they are excluded ( figure S8 ).
306
The approach we employed in this paper is referred to as multi-games [15, 53, 46] or mixed 307 games [54] in the evolutionary game theory, wherein players play two or more games with different 308 payoff matrices. Although these terms seems unlikely to be used in other fields, it has been known 309 that microbes have multiple inter-linked games or social traits [35] . For example, the production 310 of many kinds of public good is regulated by the quorum-sensing (QS) system [55] . Not only the 311 production of public good, but also the production of QS molecules can be regarded as a game due 312 to the cost of producing QS molecules and the effect of QS molecules other than regulating the 313 9/13 production of public goods [33, 37, 57] . In other words, both the production of QS molecules and 314 that of public good are games, and the game of QS molecules has an effect of the public good game. 315 In addition, recent studies have suggested that microorganisms show cyclic dominance due to 316 the existence of two games. Inglis et al [17] analysed the public good games in Pseudomonas 317 communities, wherein there exist two types of public good (i.e., two public good games) and either 318 of the two types of public good is available to each strain. In such communities, the cooperators or 319 the producers can beat the defectors in the other public good game because the defectors cannot 320 exploit the other type of public good, and therefore, cyclic dominance emerges. Another example is 321 shown by Kelsic et al [20] , where the the production of antibiotics and their degraders are combined. 322 Although the game of antibiotic production alone can show cyclic dominance, it is impossible to lead 323 the coexistence of all strategies without the spatial structure in the case of the antibiotic production 324 alone. On the other hands, the introduction of the game of degrader production maintains the cyclic 325 dominance and all strategies can coexist without the spatial structure. Considering these studies 326 and our results, multi-game dynamics might be natural in microbial communities and be a factor 327 of stabilizing cooperation and genetic diversity.
328
It should be noted that our results are based on the assumption that fruiting bodies and macro-329 cysts coexist. Although this has been shown under dark and relatively dry conditions [39] , macro-330 cysts are not formed under light conditions [14] and fruiting body formation is inhibited in water [4] . 331 Under these conditions, D. discoideum undergoes only one or the other behaviour, and cooperative 332 behaviours are not maintained. In other words, the probability of macrocyst formation θ changes 333 over time under changing environments, and cooperation between fruiting body formation and 334 macrocyst formation would be destabilized. Indeed, our model shows that cooperation of fruiting 335 body formation and macrocyst formation is not always maintained under dynamic environments 336 (SI and figure S10). Future research should consider how changing environmental conditions would 337 affect these conclusions.
338
In addition, our models are a simplification of the complex behaviours exhibited by D. dis-339 coideum. For example, we assumed distinct strategies (to cooperate or to defect) for both fruiting 340 body formation and macrocyst formation, but these strategies are continuous. Productivity and 341 sensitivity to signals for differentiation in fruiting body formation [32, 50] , or the ratio of FC cells 342 and vegetative cells in macrocyst formation [39] can be considered. In addition, we assumed that 343 starvation continues for an extended period of time. If this assumption was relaxed, our results 344 might change because a lack of aggregating cells can be beneficial for fruiting body formation and 345 macrocyst formation if the resource condition quickly recovers [47] . Under this scenario, it may be 346 possible that defectors of macrocyst formation (D M s) can beat cooperators (Cs), which would lead 347 to the collapse of cyclic dominance.
348
Moreover, our results do not contradict with those of previous studies. For example, kin dis-349 crimination by the cell adhesion proteins TgrB1 and TgrC1 [16] and the greenbeard effect encoded 350 by csA [34] are important for maintenance of cooperation in fruiting body formation. If these effects 351 are included in a model, cooperation would be maintained. Our results, on the other hand, suggest 352 that cooperation can be maintained even if such effects do not exist or if they are incomplete. 353 In addition, if kin discrimination and/or the greenbeard effect are introduced in our models and 354 D F s do not spread, defectors of macrocyst formation (D M s) may be unable to invade and only 355 cooperators (Cs) will be maintained because D M s cannot beat Cs.
356
Conclusion
357
In summary, we propose that cooperative behaviours in the social amoeba can be maintained by 358 coupling the two games. This is because cyclic dominance emerges from the common cAMP signal 359 that is necessary for aggregation in both behaviours. This result is consistent when mating types 360 and spatial structure are introduced into the model, suggesting the generality of these findings 361 and the importance of including multi-games in behavioural models, especially if the games are 362 inter-linked. Such multi-game dynamics of inter-linked games seems general in microorganisms.
